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Abstract ― This paper estimates the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates (ITR) on 
capital income, labor income and consumption, and the share of social protection expenditures 
in total public expenditures in Western and Eastern Europe. It tests the coexistence of efficiency 
and compensation effects of globalization on the expenditure and the revenue sides of 
government budgets. In Western Europe, globalization leads to an increase in social 
expenditures; however these expenditures are to an increasing extent financed by taxes on 
labor. There are important differences between the welfare states. In the conservative regimes, 
both social expenditures and taxes on labor increase due to globalization. In the social-
democratic regimes social expenditures are not affected by globalization, but ITR on labor 
increases, whereas ITR on capital and consumption decrease as a result of globalization. In the 
liberal regimes, the ITR on labor is rising, while social expenditures are declining. In the 
southern welfare regime globalization does not have any significant effects on the distribution 
of taxes or social spending. In Eastern Europe, in the Baltic States globalization leads to a 
decrease in social spending, whereas in the other Eastern European New Member States (post-
communist European regimes) there is an upward convergence in social spending due to 
globalization. The ITR on consumption decrease due to globalization in the post-communist 
European regimes, whereas in the Baltics there is no robust significant effect of globalization 
on taxes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper analyses the effects of globalization on social expenditures and the distribution of 
taxes, i.e. the tax burden on capital income, labor income, and consumption in Western and 
Eastern Europe with a focus on differences between welfare regimes.  
Tax competition theory argues that the increasing mobility of capital makes firms 
capable of avoiding taxes by choosing countries with a lower tax burden. Thus, capital mobility 
creates a pressure to reduce taxes on the mobile factor, which results in inefficiently low levels 
of capital taxes and public good provision (Oates, 1972; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). If 
government expenditures are held constant, a fall in capital taxes implies a shift of the tax 
burden to the immobile factor, i.e. labor. 
Regarding the expenditure side, there are two hypotheses on the impact of globalization. 
The efficiency hypothesis argues that globalization leads to increasing competition among 
nations to attract capital. This in turn leads to an erosion in tax revenues and a decline in public 
expenditures (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski; 1986 Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Dreher et al., 
2008a). Additionally, increasing competition changes the composition of public spending and 
leads to a shift from public goods to public inputs, i.e. a shift from expenditures that are mainly 
beneficial for residents to expenditures which aim at attracting capital (e.g. Keen and 
Marchand, 1997).   
The alternative hypothesis argues that globalization is accompanied by an increase in 
spending on public goods, in particular compensating social expenditures in response to 
increased external risks (Rodrik, 1998; Swank, 2002; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001).  
Although there is a rich empirical literature on the effects of globalization on either the 
spending or the revenue side of the government budget, studies that analyze the effects on both 
taxation and spending simultaneously are limited to Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Adam and 
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Kammas (2007), Dreher (2006a) and Dreher et al. (2008a).  There is evidence for a joint 
existence of the efficiency and compensation hypotheses, albeit via opposite effects on the two 
sides of the budget (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Adam and Kammas, 2007).  On the one 
hand the tax burden is shifting from capital to labor. On the other hand, social expenditures are 
increasing due to globalization. 
Our paper belongs to this strand of literature. Using two different sets of panel data for 
the old EU member states (EU15) and the Central and Eastern European New Member States 
(CEENMS), we estimate the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates (ITR) on capital, 
labor and consumption, and the share of social protection expenditures in total expenditures. 
Most studies focus on taxes on capital and labor, and omit the taxes on consumption. We 
measure globalization by the multi-dimensional KOF indices (Dreher, 2006b; Dreher et al., 
2008a), which capture not only the economic aspects such as trade, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), income payments to foreign nationals, portfolio investments, restrictions on trade and 
capital flows, but also the political and social dimensions of globalization.   
The first contribution of our paper is the focus on EU15 and the CEENMS. Secondly, 
we estimate whether the effects differ between the different welfare state regimes. Leibrecht et 
al. (2011) is the only study in this literature that distinguishes the effects in different welfare 
regimes in Western Europe, but their paper is limited to the effects on social expenditures only, 
whereas this paper shows that the forces of compensation and efficiency may work differently 
on the revenue and expenditure sides. Leibrecht et al. (2011) also do not account for differences 
within the CEENMS due to the short time series they use. We use an updated data set, which 
allows us to distinguish different regimes in the CEENMS. 
There is another strand of literature that focuses mainly on tax competition across 
jurisdictions based on corporate and capital gains taxes using spatial econometrics, which finds 
that corporate taxes are driven down by external tax competition rather than by internal factors 
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(Davies et al., 2003; Davies and Voget, 2008; Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 
2008). However, this literature focuses on taxes on capital, whereas our focus is to test how 
globalization affects the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget simultaneously. 
Furthermore, as Devereux et al. (2008) show, competitive downward pressure on the tax rates 
on capital is generated by the relaxation of capital controls –a variable incorporated in the KOF 
globalization indices among other variables. The advantage of using a common and broad 
measure of globalization, as in Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Adam and Kammas (2007), 
Dreher (2006a) and Dreher et al. (2008), is that we can test potential effects on different tax 
categories as well as social spending, whereas the spatial lag would be relevant mostly for taxes 
on the mobile factor of production.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section two reviews the welfare state literature and 
its relevance for the effects of globalization. Section three describes the data and stylized facts. 
Section four and five presents the estimation methodology and the results. Section six 
concludes. 
 
2. Welfare regimes and globalization    
    
Welfare regimes, and hence national economic and political institutions matter, as they shape 
or narrow down how states react to globalization (Campbell, 2005; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; 
Esping-Andersen, 1999). Pierson (1996) argues that cuts in welfare spending have been slow 
and path-dependent following the crisis of the 1970s. Different constituencies within the 
population and citizens’ expectations of the responsibilities of the welfare states are created in 
an historical institutional context. Retrenchment initiatives are associated with high electoral 
costs; similarly existing commitments like pensions lock in policy makers (Pierson, 1996). 
However, path dependency does not mean that change does not occur, but it is conditional on 
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the historical and institutional context; e.g. radical retrenchment has been easier when there is 
a significant electoral slack, or budgetary crisis (Pierson, 1996). Hacker (2004) and Streeck 
and Thelen (2005) argue that fundamental change can occur through incremental 
transformations of welfare state policies; e.g. through a slow process of privatization of welfare 
services. In some cases collective agreements between unions and employers may fill some 
gaps in welfare state provision (Trampusch, 2007; Yerkes, 2011; Johnston et al., 2011); thus 
an absence of spending by the state in response to globalization can be compensated for through 
a collectivization of risks by other actors. Change may also take the form of a shift in the focus 
of welfare spending under the pressure of new social risks linked to the changes in family 
structures, increasing female employment, working poor, precarious work, long-term 
unemployment  rather than a complete retrenchment (Bonoli, 2007; Pierson, 2001; Taylor-
Gooby, 2004, Yerkes, 2011). Globalization may have caused some of these new risks like 
precarious employment, but the new risks, and their consequences for the change in the welfare 
states are a much broader topic. 
Different welfare states create different types of labor and business organizations and 
alliances, which have an impact on the tax and expenditures policy (Campbell, 2005). For 
example, in social-democratic countries tax rates on both capital and labor are the highest in 
Europe, since there is a consensus that the revenue is utilized to finance social expenditures. In 
contrast, if social expenditure is historically low, it may be difficult to increase it under the 
pressures of globalization, given the limits to tax increases (Kautto and Kvist, 2002).   
The varieties of capitalism approach of Hall and Soskice (2001) highlights the 
importance of social spending to firms in coordinated market economies, where unemployment 
benefits with high replacement rates can facilitate workers’ interest in investing in industry-
specific skills, and coincide with the interests of firms in having access to pools of workers 
with high and specific skills. On the contrary, in the liberal welfare states, low levels of benefits 
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coincide with firms’ preferences for fluid labor markets. Thus, since firms have different 
strategies in different regimes, their demands about the responses of the states to globalization 
and risks also differ (Hall and Soskice, 2001). While it is likely to see cuts in social spending 
as a response to globalization in the liberal market economies, in the coordinated market 
economies the interests of both the firms and labor unions may lead to preserving social 
spending. 
Different welfare regimes also generate different norms about tax equity. Plümper et al. 
(2009) show that governments are restricted in how they react to tax competition by fairness 
norms as much as budget constraints, which prevent a wholesale race-to-the-bottom in capital 
taxation. 
In some cases globalization might also lead to a convergence of welfare states (Brady 
et al., 2005; Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006). In the case of less generous states globalization 
might cause upward convergence as a result of the demands of citizens in an era of political 
integration (Kautto and Kvist, 2002). 
For Western Europe, in a widely used classification Esping-Andersen (1999) groups 
countries into regimes depending on the degree of stratification, decommodification1, and the 
mix between private and public social security institutions: the social-democratic regime 
(Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway) characterized by a high decommodification index, little 
stratification and state provision of social security; the conservative regime (Germany, France, 
Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) where social security is provided partly 
by the state and partly by the market, but is strongly linked to the status of employment and to 
families, with a medium degree of decommodification; the liberal regime (United Kingdom, 
Ireland, United States) characterized by low decommodification and primarily market 
provision of social security. Esping-Andersen’s typology has been widely discussed and 
                                                          
1 Decommodification refers to public spending that reduce the reliance of the citizens on the market for some goods and 
services such as  unemployment benefits, health, and pension. 
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criticized; e.g. it has been proposed to reconsider the classification of countries, use further 
indicators regarding benefits other than cash-benefits, and integrate the gender aspects 
(Bambra, 2006; Kasza, 2002; Leibfried, 1992). Ferrara (1996) and Bonoli (1997) suggest a 
fourth southern regime including Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal with a higher degree of 
polarization than in the conservative regime and persistence of clientelism in the distribution 
of social services. The Netherlands is also argued to be a hybrid regime, which combines 
corporatist social insurance for workers with universal insurances, and more recently includes 
also liberal elements (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002). Due to its 
wide use in the literature, we adapt an extended version of Esping-Andersen’s classification by 
adding the southern welfare regime. We also do a robustness check by excluding the 
Netherlands from the sample due to its ambiguous character.  
We estimate the effects in the CEENMS separately, as these countries constitute welfare 
regimes in transition different from those in Western Europe. The specific aspects of the 
macroeconomic environment in the post-transition CEECs may also justify separate 
estimations. Due to the transition crisis extensive financial needs emerged, caused by 
increasing unemployment, early pension schemes and a decline of women’s participation in 
the labor force (Onaran, 2008). However, in an effort to attract FDI, the CEECs cut corporate 
income tax rates (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009) or introduced flat rate personal income taxes 
(Keen et al., 2008; Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). Finally the presence of a large informal 
economy led many governments to decrease tax rates to encourage formalization (Duman, 
2010). 
Although early studies position the CEECs within the liberal regime (e.g. Ferge, 2001; 
Standing, 1996), later studies argue that they form a separate welfare regime (Lelkes, 2000). 
Orenstein and Haas (2005) group all CEECs as well as other former Yugoslav republics in a 
European post-communist welfare regime and argue that the prospects of joining the EU 
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created a similar pattern of development via the accession process.  Differently, Fenger (2007) 
distinguishes a "post-communist European type" (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Croatia), a "former USSR type" (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia and 
Belarus) and a group of developing welfare states (Georgia, Romania and Moldova). The post-
communist European type in Fenger mixes characteristics of both the conservative and the 
social-democratic types. Bohle and Greskovits (2007) distinguish further regimes: a neoliberal 
type in the Baltic States, an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrad states, and a neo-
corporatist type in Slovenia. Compared to the more market-oriented Baltic States, the Visegrad 
states are more socially inclusive. The least market-oriented type is Slovenia with social 
indicators closer to West European standards.  
First, we estimate the effects of globalization in the CEENMS in aggregate, i.e. treating 
the CEENMS as a single welfare regime in transition as suggested by Orenstein and Haas 
(2005). Then in order to test whether there are different responses within the CEENMS, 
following the common point in both Fenger (2007) and Bohle and Greskovits (2007), we 
distinguish a separate Baltic regime, and group the other CEENMS as a post-communist 
European regime. It is not possible to classify Slovenia as a third regime due to the limited 
availability of time series data. 
 
3. Data and Stylized Facts 
 
3.1. Globalization  
Globalization affects the governments’ decisions in several ways: Globalization may restrain 
governments via increased budgetary pressure due to trade liberalization and increased factor 
mobility. Increased world market integration through trade, FDI, portfolio investments may 
affect the domestic economy by increasing inequality and economic insecurity, and the citizens 
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may seek to be compensated by the public sector. However, globalization goes beyond the 
economic dimensions, and incorporates also social, institutional and political aspects, 
exclusion of which could lead to biased estimates (Dreher et al., 2008a). Therefore, we employ 
the KOF indices of economic, social, and political globalization (Dreher, 2006b; Dreher et al., 
2008a). KOFecon is composed of the actual flows-index, which includes trade, FDI, income 
payments to foreign nationals and portfolio investments, and the index of restrictions on trade 
and capital flows. KOFglobal includes KOFecon as well as the index of social globalization, 
which consists of data on personal contact, information flows and cultural proximity, and the 
index on political globalization, which consists of data on the number of embassies and the 
membership in international organizations. The multi-dimensional KOF indices are a better 
way to reflect the joint effects of globalization compared to individual variables like FDI or 
trade or restrictions on capital flows (Leibrecht et al., 2011). The broader index including social 
and political globalization can incorporate further dimensions related to the influence of the 
practices in other countries on the aspirations of citizens; they also help to reflect issues of 
convergence, which may be determined via political and legislative processes in the EU.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the unweighted average KOF indices. All countries have 
experienced a significant and continuous increase in their exposure to globalization. The 
conservative and the liberal regimes show a similar development of the KOFecon, with the 
liberal regime’s index starting to rise already in the 1970s. KOFecon in the social-democratic 
regime started at a lower level, but experienced the highest increase. The southern regime has 
a lower index. The CEENMS also started from a lower level, but now have nearly reached the 
level of the EU-15. The development of the overall globalization index in the social-
democratic, conservative and liberal regimes are very similar. The catch-up process in the 
southern countries is also stronger, whereas the CEENMS have a remarkably lower index value 
throughout.  
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3.2 The Tax Burden on Capital Income, Labor Income and Consumption 
Different types of tax rates are used in empirical studies. Statutory tax rates (STRs) on capital 
or corporate income are directly derived from the tax code. However, they do not account for 
the tax base. Effective marginal and average tax rates likewise use data from the tax code. They 
measure the tax burden on a hypothetical investment project based on actual tax law (Devereux 
and Griffith, 1998; Devereux et al., 2002). A third widely used measure is average effective 
tax rates (AETRs), calculated by dividing the total tax revenue from capital or corporate 
income, labor income or consumption by the pre-tax income or consumption (Mendoza et al., 
1994; Carey and Rabesona, 2002). Eurostat is adapting this method to calculate implicit tax 
rates (ITRs).2 These tax rates are especially suitable for exploring changes in the tax burden. 
Therefore we base our analysis on the ITRs. 
For the ITRs Eurostat data is employed. The data source for the period starting in 1990 
is the Eurostat online database. These data are extended backwards to 1970 or 1980 with the 
growth rates of the ITRs calculated by the EC (2000). The data on the ITR on capital for 
Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia are extended with our own calculations, based on the method 
used by the EC.3 Thus, the data for nine countries4 reaches back until 1970, for six countries5 
until 1980, and for most CEENMS until 1995. 
Figures 3-5 show the development of the unweighted average of the ITR on capital income, 
labor income and on consumption. 
[Figure 3] 
 
                                                          
2 Eurostat’s terminology for AETR is ITR. We will further use this terminology. 
3 The ITR on capital for Romania during 1998-2004, for Bulgaria for 1999 and 2002-2007, for Slovenia during 1995-
1999 are calculated as (capital taxes as share of GDP * GDP) / (gross operating surplus - consumption of fixed 
capital) using data in Eurostat about the structure of taxes by function as share of GDP. 
4 Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom 
5 Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece Portugal, Sweden 
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Although STRs on capital decreased (Devereux et al., 2002), the ITR on capital stayed rather 
stable, due to the broadening of the tax base. The level of capital taxation is much lower in the 
CEENMS compared to Western Europe. The ITR on capital has fallen in the liberal regimes 
(apart from a recent increase), while it has been rising in the social-democratic regimes in 
particular since the mid 1990s. In the conservative regimes the ITR on capital slightly 
decreased over the whole period 1980-2007. In the southern regimes the ITR on capital had 
been considerably lower than in the other welfare state regimes until the beginning of the 1990s, 
but since then it has increased and now corresponds to that of the liberal regime. Given that the 
process of globalization has intensified in all these regimes, the differences in the developments 
in the ITRs are remarkable. There are important differences in the trends in the CEENMS as 
well. The ITR on capital fell strongly in Slovakia; maintained its initial levels in the Baltics 
despite an early period of decline, and remained quite stable in the other countries. It is 
interesting that this stability took place in the CEENMS in an era of major globalization.   
[Figure 4] 
 
The ITRs on labor are on average higher than those on capital. The difference between the ITR 
on capital and labor is much higher in the CEENMS. With the exception of the liberal regimes 
there is a converging trend in the ITRs on labor in the social-democratic, conservative and 
southern regimes. This goes along with the increase in globalization. Countries in the social-
democratic welfare regimes have the highest ITR on labor. In the countries of both the post-
communist European and the Baltic regimes the ITR on labor has been decreasing, albeit more 
strongly in the latter. All three Baltic States introduced flat tax very early in 1994-95, followed 
by Slovakia and Romania. 
[Figure 5] 
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The social-democratic regimes have the highest ITR on consumption, and the southern regimes 
have the lowest ITR in the West, although it has been constantly increasing since 1980. The 
level of the ITR on consumption in the post-communist European regimes corresponds to those 
of the conservative and liberal regimes, whereas the rate in the Baltics is slightly lower.  
 
3.3 Social Expenditures 
In order to capture the effect of globalization on the composition of spending with regard to 
public consumption goods, we focus on social expenditures, rather than intermediate spending 
categories like education or health, which are not only public consumption goods but also 
public inputs for the firms. We prefer normalizing social expenditures by total expenditures to 
normalizing by GDP in order to capture the effects on the distribution of spending (Kaufman 
and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Leibrecht et al., 2011).     
Eurostat’s classification of the functions of government (COFOG) database provides 
data on ‘social protection’ expenditure on sickness and disability, old age, family and children, 
survivors, unemployment and housing. However the COFOG data as a ratio to total 
expenditures in Eurostat is available only since 1990. The time series are extended with data 
from OECD National Accounts Vol. II. 
Figure 6 shows the development of the unweighted average of social expenditure as a ratio to 
total expenditures (socexp). 
[Figure 6] 
 
In the EU15 the social-democratic regimes have the highest share of social expenditures, which 
has been slightly rising since 1995. The trends in social spending indicate convergence among 
the social-democratic, conservative, and southern regimes towards similar levels as a share in 
total spending. It seems like globalization has not led to welfare state retrenchment in these 
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regimes; however in order to pin down the effects of globalization, we need an econometric 
analysis after controlling for other explanatory factors. In the liberal regimes, the share of social 
expenditures increased until 1994 but since then has decreased. In the CEENMS the share of 
social expenditures has been declining in both regimes, but the Baltics have a much lower 
share.  
 
4. Estimation Methodology 
 
We introduce a broad set of control variables common to both the spending and tax equations 
based on the previous empirical literature (e.g. Adam and Kammas, 2007; Bretschger and 
Hettich, 2002; Dreher et al., 2008a and 2008b; Leibrecht et al., 2011; Swank and Steinmo, 2002; 
Gemmel et al., 2008; Sanz and Velazquez, 2007; Winner, 2005): the ratio of total expenditures 
of general government to GDP (expenditure), which captures the size of the public sector; 
government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP (debt), which reflects the budget 
constraint as well as alternative means of finance; the fraction of population older than 65 years 
as a share of total population (oldage), which captures the effect of the increasing proportion 
of the dependent population on the tax and expenditure system; the growth rate of real GDP 
(growth), which aims to capture cyclical effects; inflation measured as the change in the GDP 
deflator (inflation)6; ; government party (govparty), which reflects the composition of the 
government’s cabinet and ranges from 1 to 5 (1 = hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties, 
5 = hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties); a country’s relative size - the 
proportion of a country’s GDP to the average sample GDP- (size), which is included in order to 
                                                          
6 In our sample period, there is only one year of hyperinflation (147%) in Romania in 1997, where data for the ITR on capital 
starts in 1998. For all the other variables in Romania the data starts in 1999 or later; thus there are no hyperinflation years. For 
other countries, which have experienced hyperinflation (Bulgaria, and the Baltic states), our estimation period for which data 
for the dependent variables are available does not include any hyperinflation years. The results are robust to the exclusion of 
1998 in Romania for the estimations for the ITR on capital regarding the effects of inflation as well as globalization indices. 
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avoid a possible small country bias in the coefficient of the globalization indices, as smaller 
countries are typically more open than larger.  Table A.1 in the appendix contain information 
on the variables and the databases.  
We explore the effect of globalization on social expenditures and the various ITRs by 
using the following baseline model:  
 
𝐵𝑗𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡 + γjBji(t−1)  + 𝛽𝑗𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑐  𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
Where Bj=social expenditures as a ratio to total expenditures, the ITRs on capital income, labor 
income, or consumption, and the subscript j indicates different regressions with different 
dependent variables.7 We estimate separate equations for Western Europe and CEENMS to 
allow for country-group-specific coefficients. Thus, the country index, i, ranges from 1 to 15 
for Western Europe and from 1 to 10 for the CEENMS; t is the time index ranging from 1970-
2007 for the ITRs in Western Europe, 1980-2007 for social spending in Western Europe, and 
1995-2007 in the CEENMS for all equations. 𝛼𝑗𝑖 are country fixed effects, ωjt are time fixed 
effects. 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the error term.
8 𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 is the globalization index (KOFecon or KOFglobal), and 
𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 is the matrix of control variables, all of which except for government cabinet gravity
 enter 
into the equations with a one year lag.  
The aim of using lagged explanatory variables is to incorporate the time lags in the 
decision process as well as to address the problems of endogeneity.9 Due to the low number of 
countries (cross-sections), a GMM-estimation to cope with endogeneity is not possible; 
                                                          
7 Our dependent variables as well as the explanatory variables are all ratios or growth rates, and panel unit roots reject the 
presence of unit roots; therefore we proceed with estimating the models in levels rather than differences. 
8 Following Leibrecht et al (2011) estimations are made using Schaffer’s xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 2010), which 
allows for standard errors, which are fully robust with respect to serial correlation and general heteroscedasticity, as the 
variance-covariance-matrix of the error term is calculated using the approach developed by Newey and West (1987). The 
alternative cluster-robust standard errors need a large number of clusters for reliable inference (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  
9 The government cabinet gravity is not lagged, since there is no endogeneity problem involved in this case. 
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therefore we follow Wooldridge’s (2002:301) suggestion to use lagged explanatory variables 
as a second best approach. The alternative of instrumental variables approach is also not 
reliable due to the absence of variables, which are highly correlated with globalization and the 
control variables but exogenous to taxes and spending. 
In order to account for path dependency a dynamic model using the Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator with lagged dependent variable is estimated. Again due to 
the low number of countries, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is not appropriate (also 
see Potrafke, 2009).  However, in the presence of fixed country effects, the results are biased 
for short time series (Nickell, 1981). For the EU15, where the time period is 1970-2007, this 
poses only minor problems. Judson and Owen (1999) shows that the LSDV estimator with 
lagged dependent variable performs well with unbalanced panels.10 However, for the CEENMS 
the time period is 1995-2007, thus much shorter; therefore the results for the CEENMS must be 
interpreted as indicative. 
The total expenditure as a control variable also captures the dynamic effects of path 
dependency and introduces a common exogenous constraint on both the revenue and the social 
expenditure side. 
A note about the bounded nature of the share of social expenditures and the ITRs is in 
place here: OLS assumes that the dependent variables are unbounded; however, this does not 
pose a major problem in our case, since our dependent variables are far from the bounds (0 and 
100). Moreover, Winner (2005) shows that logistic transformation does not change the results; 
but the interpretation of coefficients becomes complicated.  
                                                          
10 We nevertheless estimated the Arellano and Bover (1995)-Blundell and Bond (1998), two-step estimation using 
Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction and orthogonal deviations. However, the Hansen-J test indicates overfitting (p-value of 
1) and there is second-order autocorrelation; thus minimum requirements for reliable estimates are not met. Given the low 
number of countries in our sample, as Roodman (2009) suggests, Arellano and Bover-Blundell and Bond estimator may face 
the problem of an overabundance of instruments, which inflates the p-values of the Hansen-J test results. We also estimated 
the bias-corrected LSDV estimator developed by Bruno (2005) with the Blundell and Bond as the initial estimator, however, 
to derive the bias-correction term Bruno estimator needs a consistent first round estimator, and thus also relies on Blundell-
Bond estimates, which are not appropriate in our case as discussed above. Furthermore, Bruno estimator needs strictly 
exogenous variables, and is not applicable in the presence of even only weakly exogenous regressors.     
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Next we test for the heterogeneity of the effects of globalization in different welfare state 
regimes by extending Equation (1) as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑗𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡 + +γjBji(t−1)+  βjgGi(t−1) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑔𝑘𝐷𝑘𝑖𝑡𝐺𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑐𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 +
 ∑ 𝜌𝑘𝐷𝑘𝑇
𝑛−1
𝑘=1 +   𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡              (2) 
 
where 𝐷𝑘 is a dummy variable representing the different welfare regimes. In Western Europe 
𝐷1, 𝐷2, and 𝐷3 stand for the social-democratic, southern and liberal regimes respectively. The 
conservative regime is the base regime. In the CEENMS 𝐷1 stands for the Baltic regimes, and 
the post-communist European regime is the base regime.  We do not add the regime intercept 
dummies, since we already have country specific fixed effects. Due to limitations of degrees 
of freedom, we have interaction dummies only for the globalization indices; thus the 
coefficients of the control variables remain the same across the regimes. However, a welfare 
regime specific trend is also included in order to account for regime specific shocks, which are 
not captured by the control variables or the common time dummies as in Leibrecht et al (2011). 
Due to the presence of time dummies, one welfare specific trend is excluded.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
5.1 EU15 
Table 1 shows the results for the basic specification for the EU15. In all specifications, the 
lagged dependent variables are significant with a positive sign, verifying the importance of 
path dependency in spending and taxes. The time dummies are jointly significant in all 
specifications except the specification with KOFglobal in the estimation of ITR on labor 
(Column (5)). We keep the time dummies as well as other explanatory variables even if they 
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are insignificant, and discuss the robustness of the results where relevant. The effects of the 
globalization indices are robust to the exclusion of the other explanatory variables. 
In the EU15 an increase of economic globalization (KOFecon) has a positive effect on 
social expenditures as a ratio to total expenditures, whereas overall globalization (KOFglobal) 
is insignificant. Countries seem to be compensating for increasing risk caused by economic 
globalization by augmenting social expenditures. This compensation effect is in line with 
Gemmel et al. (2008), Hicks and Swank (1992), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Dreher et al. 
(2008b) and Leibrecht et al. (2011), although the measure of globalization may differ among 
the studies. However, Dreher (2006a), Sanz and Velazquez (2007), Dreher et al. (2008a), and 
Potrafke (2009) find no significant effect of globalization on social expenditures, but the results 
are not directly comparable, since they are very sensitive to country coverage, as we will show 
below.   
[Table 1] 
 
Regarding the effect of globalization on taxation, there is no significant effect on the ITR on 
capital (Columns (3) and (4)). This is in line with Dreher et al. (2008a), Swank (2006) and 
Swank and Steinmo (2002). However, Winner (2005) finds a negative effect of globalization 
on the ITR on capital income, while Dreher (2006a) finds a positive effect. Adam and Kammas 
(2007), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), as well as Bretschger (2010) likewise find a negative 
effect of globalization using the ITRs on corporate income as dependent variables. However, 
their measures of globalization are limited to trade volume, and different indices to measure 
legal restrictions. The results are furthermore sensitive to the country sample.  
Columns (5) and (6) show the results for the ITR on labor. Economic globalization index 
(KOFecon) has a positive effect.11 While there is no effect on taxes on capital, the tax burden 
                                                          
11In this specification, when the time effects, which are jointly insignificant, are excluded, KOFglobal is also statistically 
significant and positive. 
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on the immobile factor is rising due to globalization. This positive effect is in line with Dreher 
et al. (2008a), Adam and Kammas (2007) and Winner (2005). Likewise, Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002), Garret and Mitchell (2001) and Schwarz (2007) find a shift of the tax burden from 
capital  to labor, when estimating the ratio of taxes on capital to labor. Nevertheless, Dreher 
(2006a) finds no effect and Swank and Steinmo (2002) find a negative effect on taxes on labor; 
however the latter study uses only the capital controls index as the measure of globalization.   
Globalization has no significant effect on the ITR on consumption (Columns 7-8). 
Next, Table 2 reports the results for the four welfare state regimes in Western Europe.12 
The lagged dependent variables as well as the common time fixed effects are jointly significant 
in all specifications. The F-tests on joint significance of the coefficients (base group of the 
conservative regime plus the interaction dummy for the other three regimes) are reported at the 
end of each specification. 
[Table 2] 
 
There are significant differences between the four welfare state regimes. Overall globalization 
has a positive effect on social expenditures in the conservative regime, while in the liberal 
regime globalization is leading to a decline in social expenditures (Column 1). In the social-
democratic and southern regimes social expenditures are not affected by globalization. 
Interestingly economic globalization has no statistically significant effect in any of the regimes 
as opposed to the findings in the aggregate estimation. This shows that it is mostly the social 
and political integration that shape the demands of the citizens in the case of the conservative 
regimes; this may be linked to aspirations driven by the social-democratic models in Europe. 
Globalization is leading to a convergence of the conservative regime with lower social 
spending level towards the social-democratic regime, as suggested in the political economy 
                                                          
12 As a robustness check, we also exclude the Netherlands from the sample due to its arguably hybrid character as discussed 
in Section 2; the results are robust. 
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literature (e.g. Kautto and Kvist, 2002; Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006; Achterberg and Yerkes, 
2009; Huber and Stephens, 2001). There is no general race-to-the-bottom in terms of welfare 
regimes in the case of the conservative regimes. Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) also find that 
social globalization has a positive effect on aggregate government spending, while economic 
globalization has no effect in a larger sample of 186 countries as well as the OECD countries, 
and interpret their finding as evidence of a catch-up effect as more people have been globally 
interconnected and observed government sector in other countries.   
The negative effect of overall globalization in the liberal regimes however indicates that 
catching-up convergence is specific to the conservative regimes. In the liberal regime the 
negative effect of overall globalization without any significant effect of economic globalization 
may be an indicator that social spending cuts were motivated by a discourse about increasing 
competitive pressures in a period of rapid political integration across Europe although the 
economic pressures themselves were not significant, and these countries had a higher exposure 
to economic globalization compared to other regimes already back in the 1970s.   
The lack of a significant effect in the southern as well as social-democratic regimes 
indicates that in these countries domestic factors and path dependency are more important than 
international effects in driving social expenditures.  
Our results, based on a different database with longer time series and a dynamic rather 
than a static model are similar to Leibrecht et al. (2011) in the case of the conservative regime, 
but they do not find the negative effect in the liberal regime, while they find some negative 
effect in the case of the social-democratic regime.13     
Regarding the effect of globalization on taxes, the results are reported in columns (3) to (8). In 
the social-democratic regime, rising globalization is leading to decreasing taxes on capital, 
whereas in the other regimes there is no significant effect. It can be argued that in the social-
                                                          
13 Leibrecht et al (2011) use COFOG database which starts only in 1990s. Our database for the Western European countries 
dates back to 1980s for some countries. 
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democratic regime, where capital taxes have been significantly higher, globalization is leading 
to a downward convergence.   
Globalization leads to a rise in taxes on labor in the conservative, social-democratic, 
and liberal regimes, although in the latter two only KOFecon is significant.  There is no 
significant effect in the southern regime. Even though labor taxes in the southern regime have 
been rising more strongly than in the other regimes, apparently this rise is not caused by 
globalization, but by domestic factors. The economic significance of the effect is largest in the 
social-democratic regime.14   
Finally, economic globalization has a negative effect on the ITR on consumption in the 
conservative and social-democratic regimes.  
 
5.2 CEENMS 
Table 3 reports the results for the CEENMS pooled together. In all specifications, the lagged 
dependent variables are significant with a positive sign.   
[Table 3] 
 
In the CEENMS there is no effect of globalization on social expenditures as opposed to 
Western Europe.15 Interestingly, economic globalization is exerting an upward pressure on the 
ITR on capital16, whereas there is no statistically significant effect of globalization on the ITR 
on labor. There is a statistically significant negative effect of both globalization indices on the 
ITR on consumption. Leibrecht et al. (2011) find a negative effect of globalization on social 
expenditures; however their model is static, and their estimation period is 2000-2006 for most 
                                                          
14 In the social-democratic regime globalization has led to a 2.9%-point increase in the ITR on labor, and 1.5%-point and 1.1%-
point increases in the liberal and conservative regimes respectively. 
15 However, when the jointly insignificant time dummies are excluded, we find a positive effect of KOFecon on social 
expenditures. This seemingly non-robust finding will be discussed further below with respect to the differences between 
welfare regimes. 
16 When the jointly insignificant time dummies are excluded, there is no statistically significant effect of globalization on taxes 
on capital. 
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of the CEENMS, whereas our data cover the period of 1995-2007; i.e. also the earlier period 
of catching-up with European welfare standards.    
Next, we repeat the estimations for two different regimes in the CEENMS, i.e. a post-
communist European type, and a Baltic type. Table 4 reports the results. The lagged dependent 
variables are again significant.  
[Table 4] 
 
Our results indicate differences in the effects of globalization on taxes and spending in the 
Baltic countries and the other CEENMS, and provide some support to the arguments in Fenger 
(2007) and Bohle and Greskovits (2007) about different welfare regimes in the CEENMS. In 
the post-communist European regime the effect of globalization (KOFglobal) on social 
expenditures is significant and positive, but in the Baltic countries there is a significant negative 
effect of both indices. When the regime specific differences are controlled for, there is no 
significant effect of globalization (both indices) on the ITR on capital in any of the regimes. In 
the post-communist European type we find a negative effect of economic globalization on the 
ITRs on consumption reflecting the effects of flat tax reforms.17 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Globalization has significant effects on the government budgets; however, the responses of the 
states are shaped by the economic and political institutions in different welfare regimes. 
In Western Europe globalization leads to an increase in social expenditures. However, 
these expenditures are financed by taxes on labor. Overall on the expenditure side the 
                                                          
17 When the jointly insignificant time effects are excluded, there is significant positive effect of KOFecon on the ITR on capital 
in the Baltic countries. The low levels of the taxes in the Baltics might have helped to decrease informalization, and increase 
capital tax revenues as Duman (2010) suggests.    
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compensation hypothesis is verified whereas on the revenue side efficiency pressures prevail. 
These two hypotheses are complementary rather than competing. 
This outcome is, however, dominated by the trends in the conservative regime. There 
is evidence of catching-up convergence in the conservative regime towards the social-
democratic regime regarding social expenditures in response to political and social 
globalization. This can be interpreted as further decommodification in the conservative regimes 
towards the higher levels in the social-democratic regimes; however this is financed by higher 
taxes on labor. In the social-democratic regime, there is no evidence of welfare retrenchment 
in response to globalization, but the continuity of social spending is maintained by decreasing 
tax burden on capital and increasing taxes on labor; thus efficiency effects prevail on the 
revenue side. Further increases in labor tax can be evaluated as part of the social-democratic 
consensus to preserve the welfare regime without increasing the burden on capital. The decline 
in the ITR on consumption, which is a regressive tax, offsets part of the increase in the tax 
burden on labor in the conservative and social-democratic regimes. In the liberal regime, the 
ITR on labor increases as a consequence of globalization, whereas social spending decreases; 
thus there is evidence of efficiency effects of globalization on both the revenue and expenditure 
sides. In the southern regime globalization does not have any significant effects on the 
distribution of taxes or social spending, which is puzzling given the presence of overall upward 
convergence in social spending and taxes in these countries. Our results indicate that this 
convergence has been mainly due to internal factors rather than economic, political, or social 
globalization.  
In the CEENMS, there are also important differences between the two regimes: Globalization 
leads to compensating effects on social spending and catching-up convergence only in the post-
communist European regime, but negative efficiency effects prevail in the Baltics. The post-
communist European regime resembles the Western conservative regime in its compensating 
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response to globalization; however the effects on taxes are rather different. In the post-
communist European type we find a negative effect of globalization on the ITRs on 
consumption, and no significant effect taxes on labor or capital. In the case of the Baltics, where 
flat tax reforms took place earlier, we do not observe any robust significant effect of 
globalization on taxes. .   
There is no general race-to-the-bottom in terms of social spending in the case of the 
conservative regimes or some CEENMS. However, the negative effects of globalization on 
social spending in the liberal regimes in Western Europe and the Baltic States with already low 
levels of social spending indicate that globalization may enhance the divergences between the 
liberal regimes and other member states. Furthermore, globalization leads to an increase in the 
tax burden on labor or a decline in the tax burden on capital in Western Europe. In order to 
shed light on the exact institutional and political processes that have generated these outcomes, 
further qualitative research is required about the alliances and framing of the discourses.  
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Figure 1: KOF - Economic globalisation grouped by welfare regimes; 1970-2007 
 
 
 
Figure 2: KOF Globalisation index grouped by welfare state regime; 1970-2007 
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Note: Due to shorter time series for some countries, the aggregation for the regimes start only at a common year, as the aggregation of the unbalanced data for a regime could impose 
a misleading change in the trend. For the post-communist European regime the aggregation for the ITR on capital income includes only the years 2001-2005, the aggregation for the 
ITR on labor income and consumption includes the years 1999-2007. For the social protection expenditures the aggregation for the liberal regime includes only the years 1990-2007, 
for the social-democratic regime, the conservative regime and the southern regime the years 1995-2007, for the post-communist European regime 2002-2007 and the Baltic regime 
2000-2007. 
Figure 3. Implicit tax rate on capital income in the EU grouped by welfare 
state regime 1970-2007
Figure 4. Implicit tax rate on labor income in the EU27 grouped by welfare 
state regime 1970-2007.
Figure 5. Implicit tax rate on consumption in the EU27 grouped by welfare 
state regime 1970-2007
Figure 6. Social protection expenditures as a share of total expenditures 
grouped by welfare state regime 1990-2007.
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Data Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2000), OECD National Accounts Vol. II 
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Table 1. Estimation results for the EU15, 1970 – 2007* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.012 -0.043                0.030 -0.018                
(0.708) (0.443)                (0.172) (0.194)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.044** 0.038   0.032** -0.010   
(0.037) (0.515)   (0.044) (0.336)   
size(t-1) 0.000 -0.021 1.042** 1.050** 0.057 0.127 0.035 0.002   
-1000 (0.938) (0.014) (0.016)   (0.674) (0.313) (0.697) (0.978)   
growth(t-1) -0.194*** -0.205*** 0.163 0.147   -0.002 -0.013 0.039 0.043   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.161) (0.217)   (0.955) (0.689) (0.153) (0.115)   
inflation(t-1) -0.036 -0.044 -0.059 -0.056   0.034 0.027 0.013 0.017   
(0.409) (0.327) (0.508) (0.502)   (0.106) (0.211) (0.512) (0.411)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.014 -0.008   0.099*** 0.092*** 0.010 0.011   
(0.008) (0.007) (0.820) (0.897)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.444)   
debt(t-1) -0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.003   0.009 0.011** -0.006 -0.007*  
(0.641) (0.487) (0.930) (0.803)   (0.103) (0.042) (0.145) (0.071)   
oldage(t-1) 0.204 0.165 0.498 0.448   0.193** 0.213** 0.067 0.051   
(0.122) (0.207) (0.148) (0.207)   (0.025) (0.011) (0.269) (0.398)   
govparty -0.061 -0.056 -0.054 -0.054   -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012   
(0.235) (0.288) (0.641) (0.638)   (0.629) (0.925) (0.846) (0.618)   
L.socexp 0.724*** 0.702***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR capital 0.742*** 0.741***
(0.000) (0.000)   
L.ITR labour 0.717*** 0.716***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR consumption 0.833*** 0.834***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.821 0.823 0.702 0.702   0.931 0.931 0.837 0.837   
N 268 268 381 381 399 399 399 399
ftestTD 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.226 0.050 0.000 0.000   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option; 
F-test TD = p-values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total
expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
 
 
*1980-2007 for social expenditures 
 
31 
 
Table 2. Estimation results for the EU15 – 4 regimes, 1970 – 2007*
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.115*** 0.061                0.051* -0.031                
(0.002) (0.478)                (0.069) (0.121)                
KOFglobal*socdem(~1) -0.189*** -0.441**                -0.013 -0.002                
(0.001) (0.022)                (0.791) (0.965)                
KOFglobal*south(t-1) -0.076 -0.174*                -0.087** 0.002                
(0.185) (0.094)                (0.023) (0.963)                
KOFglobal*lib(t-1) -0.417*** -0.185                -0.065 -0.017                
(0.000) (0.199)                (0.138) (0.609)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.044 0.005   0.045** -0.033** 
(0.212) (0.952)   (0.016) (0.042)   
KOFecon*socdem(t-1) -0.055 -0.212*  0.031 -0.002   
(0.115) (0.070)   (0.306) (0.952)   
KOFecon*south(t-1) -0.107** 0.023   -0.007 0.026   
(0.024) (0.848)   (0.854) (0.375)   
KOFecon*lib(t-1) -0.117 0.263   0.021 0.056*  
(0.134) (0.207)   (0.618) (0.096)   
size(t-1) 0.004 0.026 1.185** 0.951** 0.062 0.049 -0.014 -0.062   
(0.988) (0.922) (0.017) (0.035)   (0.589) (0.643) (0.883) (0.497)   
growth(t-1) -0.145*** -0.190*** 0.197* 0.156   0.017 0.002 0.047* 0.049*  
(0.002) (0.000) (0.076) (0.179)   (0.603) (0.945) (0.084) (0.082)   
inflation(t-1) 0.005 -0.027 0.025 0.001   0.067*** 0.057** 0.025 0.026   
(0.919) (0.591) (0.802) (0.995)   (0.003) (0.012) (0.303) (0.270)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.118*** 0.071* 0.005 -0.002   0.117*** 0.108*** 0.012 0.015   
(0.004) (0.074) (0.933) (0.976)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.413) (0.327)   
debt(t-1) 0.002 -0.007 0.001 0.004   0.020*** 0.023*** -0.006 -0.007   
(0.807) (0.444) (0.955) (0.817)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.145) (0.119)   
oldage(t-1) 0.047 0.180 0.404 0.070   -0.131 -0.192* -0.054 -0.071   
(0.805) (0.335) (0.373) (0.875)   (0.199) (0.080) (0.549) (0.434)   
govparty -0.012 -0.026 -0.025 -0.006   -0.047 -0.039 0.006 -0.005   
(0.832) (0.635) (0.824) (0.953)   (0.172) (0.248) (0.821) (0.862)   
trend_socialdem 0.222*** 0.092** 0.466*** 0.338** -0.022 -0.084** 0.006 0.017   
(0.000) (0.034) (0.007) (0.022)   (0.623) (0.032) (0.856) (0.597)   
trend_southern 0.135** 0.162** 0.344** 0.132   0.232*** 0.150*** 0.049 0.017   
(0.050) (0.018) (0.019) (0.428)   (0.000) (0.005) (0.261) (0.641)   
trend_liberal 0.279*** 0.005 0.116 -0.190   0.052 -0.014 -0.005 -0.048*  
(0.002) (0.925) (0.316) (0.239)   (0.173) (0.672) (0.848) (0.070)   
socexp(t-1) 0.588*** 0.666***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
ITR capital(t-1) 0.685*** 0.706***
(0.000) (0.000)   
ITR labor(t-1) 0.654*** 0.625***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
ITR consumption(t-1) 0.806*** 0.799***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.844 0.832 0.720 0.720   0.937 0.938 0.841 0.841   
N 268 268 381 381 399 399 399 399
ftestTD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.046 0.012 0.000 0.000   
ftest_socialdem 0.150 0.680 0.023 0.054   0.409 0.002 0.328 0.096   
ftest_south 0.431 0.110 0.196 0.764   0.268 0.293 0.351 0.796   
ftest_liberal 0.000 0.296 0.290 0.119   0.692 0.059 0.103 0.401   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option; F-test TD = p-
values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax
rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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*1980-2007 for social expenditures 
Table 3. Estimation results for the CEENMS, 1995-2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.213 0.088                -0.045 -0.116*                
(0.304) (0.412)                (0.562) (0.067)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.089 0.099*  0.026 -0.070** 
(0.277) (0.083)   (0.444) (0.026)   
size(t-1) -24.661** -24.168** 1311 -1133 1522 1649 -2142 0.077   
(0.019) (0.016) (0.840) (0.849)   (0.729) (0.665) (0.659) (0.987)   
growth(t-1) -0.236* -0.214* 0.092 0.108   -0.122** -0.127** -0.013 -0.032   
(0.074) (0.094) (0.358) (0.260)   (0.045) (0.040) (0.770) (0.485)   
inflation(t-1) -0.109 -0.093 0.061* 0.061*  -0.074*** -0.073*** 0.010 0.007   
(0.143) (0.208) (0.054) (0.056)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.521) (0.640)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.027 0.028 -0.075 -0.076   0.042 0.047 0.087** 0.088** 
(0.832) (0.827) (0.361) (0.342)   (0.345) (0.304) (0.015) (0.013)   
debt(t-1) 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.023   0.050** 0.048** -0.037** -0.038***
(0.544) (0.583) (0.241) (0.228)   (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006)   
oldage(t-1) -2.129*** -1.811** 0.828 1.089** -0.323 -0.303 -0.134 -0.357   
(0.005) (0.026) (0.137) (0.040)   (0.294) (0.384) (0.660) (0.235)   
govparty -0.499* -0.491* 0.049 0.014   -0.120 -0.121 -0.263** -0.249** 
(0.076) (0.072) (0.639) (0.895)   (0.242) (0.228) (0.021) (0.029)   
L.socexp 0.401*** 0.412***                
(0.008) (0.007)                
L.ITR capital 0.848*** 0.851***
(0.000) (0.000)   
L.ITR labour 0.529*** 0.526***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR consumption 0.460*** 0.458***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.539 0.538 0.726 0.734   0.737 0.737 0.673 0.679   
N 84 84 101 101 108 108 108 108
ftestTD 0.162 0.214 0.375 0.347   0.106 0.022 0.000 0.000   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option; 
F-test TD = p-values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total
expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4. Estimation results for the CEENMS – 2 regimes, 1995-2007  
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
socexp socexp itr_cap itr_cap   itr_lab itr_lab itr_con itr_con   
b/p b/p b/p b/p   b/p b/p b/p b/p   
KOFglobal(t-1) 0.397* -0.050                -0.066 -0.108                
(0.076) (0.769)                (0.501) (0.164)                
KOFglobal*baltic(~1)-0.684*** 0.265                -0.096 -0.036                
(0.005) (0.395)                (0.578) (0.836)                
KOFecon(t-1) 0.147 0.041   -0.014 -0.078** 
(0.127) (0.605)   (0.744) (0.022)   
KOFecon*baltic(t-1) -0.249** 0.188   -0.100 -0.038   
(0.037) (0.262)   (0.292) (0.704)   
size(t-1) -23.593** -23.851** -4371 -3274 -2649 -1673 -2143 -0.746   
(0.028) (0.016) (0.599) (0.622)   (0.597) (0.686) (0.668) (0.875)   
growth(t-1) -0.179 -0.194 0.112 0.101   -0.057 -0.063 -0.008 -0.014   
(0.153) (0.127) (0.263) (0.293)   (0.338) (0.280) (0.868) (0.774)   
inflation(t-1) -0.126* -0.113 0.076*** 0.073** -0.065*** -0.066*** 0.009 0.008   
(0.074) (0.125) (0.009) (0.011)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.584) (0.601)   
expenditure(t-1) 0.094 0.063 -0.111 -0.095   0.024 0.025 0.091** 0.085** 
(0.450) (0.616) (0.270) (0.267)   (0.615) (0.572) (0.042) (0.035)   
debt(t-1) 0.014 0.019 0.031 0.027   0.057*** 0.056*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.703) (0.595) (0.164) (0.179)   (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)   
oldage(t-1) -2.854** -2.797** 1.811** 1.586** 0.817** 0.755** -0.100 -0.094   
(0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016)   (0.033) (0.031) (0.805) (0.801)   
govparty -0.442 -0.432 -0.038 -0.045   -0.171** -0.155* -0.260** -0.255** 
(0.162) (0.149) (0.761) (0.708)   (0.041) (0.055) (0.029) (0.023)   
trend*baltic 1.071** 0.628 -0.628 -0.450   -0.193 -0.185 0.039 -0.026   
(0.014) (0.101) (0.241) (0.216)   (0.480) (0.304) (0.900) (0.901)   
L.socexp 0.389*** 0.419***                
(0.003) (0.004)                
L.ITR capital 0.800*** 0.816***
(0.000) (0.000)   
L.ITR labour 0.531*** 0.527***                
(0.000) (0.000)                
L.ITR consumption 0.459*** 0.452***
(0.000) (0.000)   
r2 0.564 0.551 0.735 0.740   0.766 0.765 0.674 0.683   
N 84 84 101 101 108 108 108 108
ftestTD 0.158 0.249 0.373 0.350   0.203 0.118 0.000 0.000   
ftest_baltic 0.191 0.435 0.280 0.093   0.180 0.170 0.310 0.216   
Newey-West-HAC robust p-values in parentheses; estimates based on Schaffer's xtivreg2 command with bw(2) robust option;
F-test TD = p-values of test of significance of time dummies; socexp: social protection expenditures as share of total
expenditures, ITR cap: implicit tax rate on capital income, ITR lab: ITR on labour income, ITR con: ITR on consumption; *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Data Sources and description 
 
 
  
 
 
